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Abstract 
In recent years the importance of corporate governance (CG) has rising new attention, 
as the 2008 financial crisis illustrates. Co-operative members, staff, regulators and 
others stakeholders involved in the co-operative banking business became aware of 
the need to strengthen co-operatives governance, since this is crucial to safeguarding 
sound management and, ultimately, to the survival and sustainability of these 
organizations. With their origins rooted in the 16th century, the Portuguese 
Agricultural Credit Co-operatives (CCAM) have been considered central players in 
the economic and social development of rural regions. The goal of this paper is to 
determine the impact of the different governance mechanisms of co-operative banks on 
control management, by analysing CCAM governance and assess its efficiency in 
disciplining management. Hence, using data from 1995-2009 period, and multinomial 
logit models, the relation between CCAM performance and several control 
mechanisms operating within the SICAM is analysed. The results show that overall 
internal governance mechanisms are not related to the CCAM performance, which 
indicates potential weakness of the CCAM internal control mechanisms. On the other 
hand, external governance mechanisms are related to CCAM operational and cost 
efficiency indicators, demonstrating the importance of these mechanisms in 
disciplining CCAM management. Moreover, the results highlight the value of the 
supervision task of Central CCAM in the performance of the associates. 
Keywords: Governance, control mechanisms, co-operatives, integrated systems. 
JEL-Codes: D23, G34 and L30. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years the importance of corporate governance (CG) has rising new 
attention, as the 2008 financial crisis illustrates. Co-operative members, staff, 
regulators and others stakeholders involved in the co-operative banking business 
became aware of the need to strengthen co-operatives governance, since this is 
crucial to safeguarding sound management and, ultimately, to the survival and 
sustainability of these organizations. Indeed, co-operatives, like investor-owned 
firms (IOFs), are subject to pressure for greater efficiency and change in CG, 
being important for co-operatives to consider CG within the framework of their 
origins and building up an effective system of internal control (Pellervo, 2000). 
The dominant economic view in economic analysis is that CG deals with the 
relation between owners and managers, following the agency theory. Using this 
approach the question to solve is how to make a manager committed enough to 
the creation of long-term shareholder value as if it was his own money (Tirole, 
2006). Even though the question of controlling managers is basically the same in 
both co-operatives and IOFs, the co-operative has many special features that 
make governance different and challenging, particularly, their ownership 
character, goal setting, methods of financing and profit distribution and decision 
making process. These differences bind not only members more effectively to 
the activities and running of the co-operative, but also blur the ownership role 
and bring the owners many other interests in addition to the success of the firm 
(Pellervo, 2000). 
The CG mechanisms available for co-operatives to discipline management 
differ from those of IOFs (Staatz, 1987; Trechter et al., 1997; Pellervo, 2000). 
Co-operatives do not have the stock market mechanism for assessing their 
performance (and its management), unlike stock-listed companies they are not 
scrutinized by the financial media.  Indeed the particular features of the capital 
shares of co-operatives1 inhibit it to be used as channel of information and 
control as in the listed companies. Also hostile takeovers or threat of hostile 
takeover that can lead to the change in management is not available in co-
operatives and the application of the democratic principle “one member one 
vote” prevents the accumulation of votes into blocks and consequently the 
monitoring by blocks of shareholders. Finally, the alignment of managerial and 
members interests through executive compensation contracts is difficult, since  
co-operatives could not use the market share value as a performance indicator or 
use share options as part of the remuneration package. 
                                                          
1
 Co-operatives share capital: (a) varies in size (as function of the entry/exit of co-operative 
members); (b) is accumulated either in proportion to member purchases or investments of the 
same sum (members do not invest according on the basis of risk as in IOFs); (c) investment in 
share capital is not freely transferable (sellable) to another person as is a normal shareholding; 
(d) the value of an investment in co-operative share capital is not determined by the market 
(repayment of shares is at par value) (Pellervo, 2000). 
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The absence of these control mechanisms implies that for disciplining the 
management co-operatives rely on active and continuous monitoring by the 
board of directors (BoD). It can be a problematic task, since the BoD of co-
operatives are less likely than the boards of IOFs to monitor or replace 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rasmusen, 1988) and its delegated power 
can be damaged by the usually low level of member participation in the co-
operative life, including the exercise of voting in general assembly (Spear, 
2004). 
Being the critical link between members and managers, BoD key functions 
include over-watching co-operative operations and hire/dismiss management. 
Particular issues for co-operative boards derive from their elected status which 
provides no certainty that directors will hold the right skills mix and knowledge 
to effectively scrutinise management decisions. Frequently, directors do not 
work full-time or they lack the relevant education to exercise their functions, 
potentially leading managers to exploit these weaknesses for their own benefit. 
Indeed, the co-operative systems of governance contribute to the development 
of powerful and entrenched managers who have more control than in similar 
IOFs2. Furthermore, in the context of co-operative governance structures and 
especially elected boards, beyond the member-manager conflict, there is also the 
member-board conflict to consider.  Co-operative boards can pursue their own 
interests at the expense of members as well as be inclined to interfere with the 
operational responsibilities of managers. Examples of governance problems 
include directors becoming rent-seekers, taking steps to make sure that members 
cannot participate, becoming self-perpetuating groups, holding meetings without 
telling members and giving themselves inappropriate loans (Shaw, 2007; Cuevas 
and Fischer, 2009). To overcome these weaknesses and develop the co-operative 
model is essential an effective CG, particularly one that become larger and adopt 
multi-tier (e.g., management and supervisory) board structures (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2001). 
With their origins rooted in the 16th century, the Portuguese Agricultural 
Credit Co-operatives (CCAM) have been considered central players in the 
economic and social development of rural regions. Together in association with 
Central CCAM (Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo) they form the 
SICAM (Sistema Integrado de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo), the heart of the Crédito 
Agrícola Group (CA).  With 903 local banks and a network of 750 branches, 
spread throughout the country, CCAM provide financial services to less 
privileged customers, mainly to small-and medium-scale savers, farmers, SMEs 
                                                          
2
 The development of managerial dominance within co-operatives is linked with the declining 
of the role of membership in governance (members’ apathy), the expansion of the co-
operative and a growing domination of commercial values fostered by a professional 
management distanced from co-operative values (Meister, 1984; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; 
Cornforth, 2004; Malo and Vezina, 2004; Spear, 2004). 
3
 85 associated to SICAM + 5 operating outside SICAM. 
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and traders, located in hinterland regions. Their historical background and 
importance in boosting local development gives them a key role in regional 
economic growth, promoting the economic recovery. 
CCAM are regulated by the legislation specific to co-operatives and partly 
covered by company law, and in their banking activity they are subject to similar 
regulations as those applied to the banking system as a whole. But CCAM differ 
from banks in two important aspects: they are non-profit firms (therefore return 
of profits is restricted); and they do not have access to publicly raised capital. 
The CCAM capital base growth is supported by their retained net benefit. Thus 
understanding how CCAM governance can work on correcting bad economic 
performance is a matter of crucial importance to overcome this constraint and 
ensure the economic and financial survival of CCAM. 
The goal of this paper is to determine the impact of the different governance 
mechanisms of co-operative banks on controlling management, by analysing 
CCAM governance and assess its efficiency in disciplining management. Hence, 
using data from 1995-2009 period, and multinomial logit models, the relation 
between CCAM performance and several control mechanisms operating within 
the SICAM is analysed. The CCAM information was collected from CCAM 
Annual Reports, legislation, CCAM by-laws and other official documents, 
complemented by a questionnaire to CCAM managers regarding CCAM 
governance, including membership and governance and management bodies 
functioning. 
The remainder of the paper consists of three sections: section 2 provides a 
summary of the governance structure and mechanisms operating in the CCAM 
associated from SICAM; section 3 describes the model, sample and results; and 
section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. The CCAM Governance Model 
2.1. SICAM Governance Structure 
The Crédito Agrícola Group has a three-fold structure: local member banks 
(CCAM), Central CCAM (the network’s central bank) and the subsidiary firms. 
In its essence, SICAM is an integrated system of separate CCAM and the 
Central CCAM, a network cooperative bank model with a powerful central 
bank. The autonomy of the local CCAM, combined with the assistance the local 
CCAM receive from Central CCAM, creates a decentralized, but strongly 
orchestrated, bottom-to-top decision making process. Figure 1, includes a 
summary of the skeleton of the SICAM structure of governance, the different 
governance bodies and linkages between them. 
Similarly to most of Portuguese IOFs, local CCAM have adopted the so 
called, “Reinforced” Latin Model, as stipulated in corporations’ law, but 
maintaining the General Assembly (GA) competences deriving from the Co-
operative Code. In the “Reinforced” Latin Model, the management and 
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supervising responsibilities are divided among the Board of Directors (BoD), the 
Audit Board and a Statutory Auditor (ROC - Revisor Oficial de Contas) 
independent of the Audit Board. It is this last element that provides the 
characteristic of “reinforced” model, since the Audit Board has the function of 
effective monitoring and auditing CCAM operations and the ROC the power of 
analysis and certification of CCAM accounts. 
In most CCAM, the BoD delegates management powers in an Executive 
Committee or into two or more Chief-Executive Officers. The two biggest 
CCAM have adopted an advisory board to support the Board of Directors, being 
all the directors also executive directors. 
Figure 1 – Governance structure of SICAM 
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Central CCAM adopted a different governance model with an Advisory 
Board4 as mandatory by RJCAM. Additionally, the BoD is also the Executive 
Board of Directors. According the bylaws, there are matters or category of acts 
that require previous approval of the General and Supervisory Board. The 
auditing activities are carried out by the General and Supervisory Board and 
Statutory Auditor. 
2.2. SICAM Governance Control Mechanisms 
In terms of CG mechanisms, the CCAM associated to SICAM present a two-
tier system: the individual and the system mechanisms. The analysis of the 
RJCAM, CCAM Annual Reports, by-laws and other official documents and the 
responses of a questionnaire filled by CCAM managers5, result in the 
identification of the governance mechanisms working in SICAM as illustrated in 
Figure 2 and briefly described in the following subsections. 
Figure 2 – CCAM governance mechanisms 
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4
 The Advisory Board comprises “… a maximum of 15 members, of which 9 correspond to 
CCAM elected among the associates not represented in the other social bodies, and the 6 
remain to non-elected members, being the corresponding places filled up for inherence of 
functions or by personalities of recognized merit, external to the SICAM”. These 6 external 
(not CCAM) advisory members are an innovation of the 2009 alterations on Agricultural 
Credit and Agricultural Credit Co-operatives Legal Regime (RJCAM) and an effort to bring 
some independence and outside SICAM expertise to SICAM management. Additionally, 
contrary to former RJCAM, this RJCAM amend left open the advisory board competences to 
be defined by Central CCAM bylaws. 
5
 A questionnaire was sent to CCAM management intending to collect data in order to 
characterize CCAM membership and governance. The goal was to identify the different 
typologies of CCAM governance and construct an econometric model to relate it with CCAM 
performance in order to identify the most efficient one. Despite Central CCAM collaboration 
in the administration of the questionnaire (the questionnaire was send directly by Central 
CCAM to its associates) the rate of response was slightly bellow of 30%, thus, ruining its 
econometric use. 
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2.2.1. Regulatory framework 
The regulatory framework, including legislation and bylaws, contains the 
general rules governing the firm (what governance bodies it should have and 
how their members are elected, what to disclose concerning the company’s 
operations, etc.) and plays a central role in the control of the company (Pellervo, 
2000). Similar to most Western European countries, Portuguese co-operatives 
are regulated by legislation specific to co-operatives, the Co-operative Code, 
complemented by each sector’s particular regulations, the RJCAM for CCAM, 
and partly covered by company law. The Co-operative Code and the General 
Regime of Credit and Financial Institution are the subsidiary law. CCAM by-
laws comply with them. 
2.2.2. Ownership structure 
Except for banking operations, the CCAM are ruled following the traditional 
co-operative structure with open membership, democratic control and restricted 
residual claims. Consequently, the CCAM members do not see the CCAM 
capital as a financial investment and the ownership structure is highly dispersed. 
Figure 3 includes a description of the consequences/effects of the “co-operative 
nature” on the ownership structure of CCAM. 
Figure 3 – Co-operative doctrine and ownership structure of CCAM 
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As a consequence of the CCAM dispersed ownership, they lack the control 
over management exercised by large (share) owners or block shareholders. 
Furthermore, by distributing equally the control rights over the CCAM 
members, power is transferred to the management. The equity ownership 
structure is exogenous and cannot be adjusted to eliminate managerial 
inefficiency (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). 
2.2.3. Internal monitoring 
Internal monitoring includes monitoring by the BoD and internal control and 
audit and aims to achieve reasonable assurance of the CCAM running 
accordingly to members’ purpose, laws and regulations. 
CCAM typical governance structure preserves the co-operative nature of 
CCAM through the composition and competences of the General 
Assembly (GA), although it strengthens the CCAM management and 
supervising bodies’ competences. It is a governance structure that reflects the 
respect for co-operative principles and the need to maintain a high level of 
monitoring and coordination, designed to promote management transparency 
and members’ participation, and to ensure the effective operations of the 
organization. Figure 4 summarizes CCAM internal governance control. 
Figure 4 – CCAM internal governance control 
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The GA is the supreme governing body of cooperatives, reflecting its 
democratic character and the guardian role of the CCAM co-operative identity. 
Members exercise control over CCAM activities participating and voting in GA 
meetings. This control is mainly done ex-post and can be damaged by members’ 
low level of participation and the predominance of members-employees in the 
GA meetings. 
The Audit Board and Statutory Auditor duo is the pillar of the CCAM internal 
control systems as it monitors, on a regular basis, its performance and activities, 
in accordance with the law, GA and Central CCAM deliberations, CCAM 
conduct code and Bank of Portugal regulations. The Audit Board supervision (or 
control) function is performed ex-ante. Historically, Audit Board role was 
neglected as its members often lack the skills and will to perform their function.  
The adoption of the corporations’ law, following 2009 RJCAM alterations, 
empowered the monitoring function of the Audit Board, since one of the audit 
board members must have the skills required for the task (at least one of the 
members must hold an undergraduate degree suitable for the exercise of his/her 
functions and be knowledgeable in auditing and accountancy) and the Statutory 
Auditor is a qualified and certified auditor (ROC- Revisor Oficial de Contas). 
The Portuguese Co-operative Code does not establish a separation between 
BoD and Management, being the CCAM direct administration made by its own 
members, elected by the GA. In these circumstances, the supervising function 
stays on the non-executive directors’ role [who should participate in strategic 
decisions and have the “challenger” function (CMVM, 2006)] and on the Audit 
Board and Statutory Auditor. 
The discussion on BoD efficiency highlights issues related with its size (by 
law an odd number), composition, meetings frequency, term of office and body 
working rules. In general, the BoD is composed by three members. However, 
historically, CCAM BoD post-merger (or incorporation) events can have up to 
five or seven members, in order to include utmost of the BoD members of the 
former CCAM. Since 2009, with the adoption of the corporations rules, that 
practice was almost discarded (extra BoD members are now part of the Advisory 
Board or non-existent). 
Traditionally, the CCAM directors are members of the co-operative, but it is 
allowed, under CCAM bylaws, for non-members to be elected directors if the 
members lack the necessary banking expertises to perform their duties. Still, in a 
considerable number of CCAM, BoD members are former CCAM employees 
with management and banking skills and a deep knowledge of the co-operative 
operations, thus, having the right profile to appraise BoD operations and 
decisions. On the other hand, a great number of CCAM still depend on part-time 
directors to carry on their day-to-day activities, with the inherent negative 
impact of it on CCAM performance. 
In CCAM there is no limit to the number of mandates and most of CCAM 
directors are in office for decades, until death surrenders them! 
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Concerning working rules, often, the BoD president (chairman) has a 
qualitative vote and is the one who has the functions of CEO in the Portuguese 
co-operatives, including personal liability. When the CEO is also the BoD 
president, as happens in many CCAM, that person occupies a very powerful 
position6. The flow of information between board and management is crucial to 
an efficient boarding working. CMVM (2007:31) recommends that “When 
Directors that carry out executive duties are requested by other Board Members 
to supply information, the former shall do so in a timely manner and the 
information supplied shall adequately suffice the request made… The Chair of 
the Executive Committee shall send the convening notices and minutes of the 
meetings to the Chair of the Board of Directors and, when applicable, to the 
Chair of the Supervisory Board and the Audit Committee…”. 
The double role of CEO and BoD chairman of most of the CCAM presidents 
puts them in a position to choose how closely the (non-executive) Board is kept 
informed of the state of the business. By rule, CCAM management reports to the 
boards on a monthly basis, BoDs meet on a weekly basis7 and the Audit Board 
on a quarterly basis. In these circumstances, BoD is dominated by executive 
directors, whom often have access to better information than non-executive 
directors. Audit Board can consider this reporting practice adequate to its needs. 
2.2.4. External monitoring 
Since co-operatives do not have access to publicly raised capital, in order to 
increase their capital base, they can normally only ask their members to increase 
their capital input, or increase the number of members. Furthermore, in addition 
to equity and retained net benefit, co-operatives can finance their operations by 
borrowing. The importance of debt financing, as a management control 
mechanism, has been emphasised as the burden of debt ties managers’ hands 
and forces them to work efficiently in order to maintain the debt in regular 
intervals (Pellervo, 2000). In this way, Jensen (1986) argues that increases in 
firm leverage helps reducing the inefficiencies resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
  
                                                          
6
 This circumstance where a chief executive has the dual role of being the (supervised) chief 
executive and the (supervising) chairman of the board is hardly conducive to being critical. [A 
board of directors should be able to dismiss, when necessary, the chief executive – how can 
this succeed if he is also the president of the board? (Pellervo, 2000)]. The most prevalent 
argument against this CEO duality arises from agency theory which concludes that an 
independent board structure improves the board’s control over the management. On the other 
hand, stewardship theory supports CEO duality. It argues that the separation of the Chairman 
and CEO roles may be the cause of conflict situations (Kan and Omari, 2009). 
7
 On average, CCAM BoD meets 80 times per year, between, 52 weekly ordinary meetings, 
12 monthly coordination meetings, 4 quarterly general meetings, 4 quarterly of auditing report 
meetings, 1 annual assessment meeting and 7 extraordinary meetings (the Audit Board meets 
5 times and the GA meets 2 times year). 
14 
In the CCAM case, the Insurance Fund of Agricultural Co-operative Credit 
(FGCAM) is an important creditor of financial distressed CCAM and it actively 
controls their performance. Besides securing the CCAM customer deposits, 
FGCAM supports SICAM solvency and liquidity. FGCAM subordinated loans 
are conditioned to an economic and financial restructuring process, monitored 
closely by FGCAM, which can interfere in the CCAM management. 
Central, multi-tier structures play a special role in the supervision of co-
operatives. A central co-operative is often given the power to monitor and even 
directly intervene in the affairs of the co-operative members (Pellervo, 2000). 
Within SICAM, management controls are often exercised by Central CCAM 
which has the function of supervising the members and consequently is usually 
the first to find out managerial failures. 
Although Bank of Portugal is responsible for the banking sector supervision, 
regarding SICAM associates the law delegates great part of these functions in 
the Central CCAM which, in turn, is under Bank of Portugal supervision. Hence, 
without damaging Bank of Portugal competences, Central CCAM is empowered 
to control their associated CCAM administrative, technical and financing 
aspects and their organization and management. In cases of gross 
mismanagement Central CCAM can intervene in the associates, by the 
assignment of a representative to track CCAM management or the nomination 
of interim directors. Moreover, when the associated is in (risk of) financial 
imbalance and un-follow Central CCAM guidelines, Central CCAM can assign 
interim directors to them and even dismiss total or partly of the members 
management and supervision boards. This control function of the Central 
CCAM is mainly done ex-ante. 
During the 1995-2010 periods Central CCAM intervened in 62 CCAM, in 11 
of them the BoD was suspended and in 4 of them both the BoD and the Audit 
Board were suspended. Interventions have up to one year of lifetime, after which 
it can be renewed. In two of the biggest CCAM, it was settled a Management 
Board formed by Central CCAM workers (under the assistance agreements) and 
the intervention continues for more than a decade. 
2.2.5. “Market” for corporate control 
The traditional co-operatives are not under the effect of takeover corporate 
control mechanisms. Since they do not have publicly quoted shares, they cannot 
be taken over by acquiring a majority shareholding on the stock market and then 
replacing the management. However, regarding CCAM, merger activity is a 
very important corporate control mechanism. Long term inefficiencies are 
usually solved through (somewhat imposed) incorporations into (or mergers 
with) a more efficient CCAM. CCAM mergers act as an external control 
mechanism because, although mergers are friendly (they must be approved by 
the GA), the influence of Central CCAM is considerable, as the trigger and even 
the one that chooses the merger partners (Cabo, 2003). 
15 
Historically, CCAM mergers activity was part of an entrepreneurial 
restructuring strategy in order to solve CCAM inefficiency. Indeed, a 1992 
SICAM study (see Cabo, 2003) refers that, to generate consistent returns, a 
typical CCAM must have a volume of deposits up to 70 million euro, a value not 
achieved by 96.6% of the CCAM at that time. Under Central CCAM lead, 
inefficient CCAM were incorporated or merged with more efficient CCAM, 
often after a Central CCAM intervention or lobbying action, and as a result, 
since the creation of SICAM the number of CCAM decreased to 2/5 of them. 
Nowadays, the restrictions to internal growth imposed by the CCAM 
territorial feature8 make smaller CCAM potential targets for bigger CCAM 
directors eager to continue their CCAM expansion plans. Hence, smaller CCAM 
directors are pressured to present high results in order to avoid incorporation. 
2.2.6. Executive compensation 
Management (and staff) remuneration schemes have become an important 
instrument of corporate governance. This is not just a desire to motivate 
managers to work harder or guarantee them a competitive salary (thereby 
obtaining the best people), but a way of getting them to work in the interests of 
the owners. Owners and managers should have parallel objectives and these 
should be reflected in the governance and remuneration mechanisms (Pellervo, 
2000). 
Following CMVM (2007) recommendations, the remuneration of the 
members of the CCAM supervising bodies consists exclusively of a fixed 
amount, in order to secure its objectivity and fairness. Regarding the 
management, CMVM (2007) recommends that the remuneration of the members 
of the BoD shall be aligned with the interests of the shareholders. Thus the 
remuneration of Directors carrying out executive duties shall be based on 
performance. However, the majority of CCAM does not do so and Directors 
remunerations are fixed. The specific nature of CCAM determines the 
inexistence of any type of attribution of shares or stock options for the BoD. The 
exceptions set a mix of fixed plus variable remuneration, usually a percentage of 
CCAM profits to distribute among their executive Directors limited to a given 
amount. One of the CCAM, for example, applies “a variable remuneration 
equivalent to 2.5% of the positive net profits, with an annual overall limit of 
50,000€”, to give out to three executive directors. 
The fixed remuneration usually consists of a voucher of around 250€ per each 
meeting attended. Some CCAM differentiate between BoD and other boards 
meetings, remunerating the first ones with higher amounts. Others stipulate an 
upper limit to the number of meetings remunerated per month, independently of 
the actual number of meetings realized. 
                                                          
8 CCAM activity is restricted to their headquarter municipality. CCAM can expand to an 
adjacent region if there is no other CCAM operating there, or when that results from a CCAM 
merger event. 
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Besides the remunerations referred, CCAM directors can obtain other 
compensations by participating in the governance bodies of other Crédito 
Agrícola Group companies. When CCAM BoD members are (former) CCAM 
employees, they maintain the salary and other benefits as long as they are in the 
Office, although the law stipulates that the contractual labour relationship is 
suspended. 
Contractual remuneration chart schemes aside, a look into CCAM annual 
proposals for profits allocation indicates that CCAM reward BoD and staff in 
accordance with the profits. This practice can be assumed as covered variable 
remuneration, intending to boost up BoD and staff performance. 
Considering that CCAM face survival challenges related to financial issues 
linked with equity capital deficiencies and that its capital base growth is 
supported by retained profits, understanding how CCAM governance can be 
used to correct low economic performance is of crucial importance. 
3. Model, data and results 
Assuming that legislation and ownership structure affect equally all the 
CCAM and that Central CCAM intervention, merger activity or BoD and 
executive compensation have different impact on individual CCAM, this section 
is dedicated to assess the efficiency of the different control mechanisms 
available to discipline CCAM management, i.e., to test if there is any relation 
between CCAM performance and those mechanisms.  The focus is on the 
mechanisms that reflect direct monitoring inside SICAM;9 the supervision 
function exercised by Central CCAM; the members control in GA, reflected in 
BoD turnover and peers’ control by CCAM merger/incorporation activity. 
3.1. Model 
To analyse the determinant factors of CCAM governance control mechanisms 
the multinomial logit model is used, in line of others studies on banking 
(Prowse, 1997; Barro and Barro, 1990; Blackwell et al., 1994; Anderson and 
Campbell, 2000; Crespi et al., 2004). 
The multinomial logit is used, reflecting the values of the dependent variable, 
seven different situations (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6)10, as shown in Table 1. The value 
of each event in the t period will be determined according to the behaviour of 
the CCAM in the t+1 period. Multiple equations are estimated jointly in order to 
make efficient use of the available information (Greene, 2000), and the 
coefficients for each possible outcome are to be interpreted with respect to a 
                                                          
9
 Executive compensation and debt-holder FGCAM monitoring mechanisms were not 
considered. The first because data was only available to the 2010 year, and the second 
because, FGCAM debt-holder monitoring function was not, a priori, “present” to all CCAM. 
10
 The values assigned to every governance intervention only reflect different categories, and 
the ordinal value has no further meaning. 
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reference group. In our case, the reference group represents the CCAM that did 
not experience any governance intervention in any particular year (value 0 of the 
dependent variable). 
In the case of the merger operation it can adopt the form of a merger or 
incorporation. In the last one, only the CCAM merger target (incorporated) was 
considered in the analysis. 
Central CCAM intervention can take the form of the nomination of an agent, 
usually to decide on and manage credit risks, or taking a safeguard, strong and 
deeper decision, by the nomination of interim directors and eventual 
replacement of the full body. 
BoD turnover can assume the form of a partial turnover or a total board 
turnover. The first alternative is the most usual in our sample, since there are 
only 27 cases of total board turnover. Furthermore, only the cases for which 
there is evidence that the board and chairman changes are not due to retirement 
or death are considered. Moreover, given that mergers are often followed by 
changes in the BoD, for those CCAM that continue, changes in their 
management are not considered. 
Table 1 – Values assumed by the dependent variable in the MNL models 
Model Dependent variable 
Model 1– Aggregated Model 0 – No intervention 
1 – BoD turnover 
2 – Central CCAM intervention and merger/incorporation 
Model 2 – Extended Model 0 – No intervention 
1 – BoD partial turnover 
2 – Chairman turnover 
3 – BoD total turnover 
4 – Central CCAM intervention by nomination of an Agent 
5 – Central CCAM intervention by nomination of interim 
Directors 
6 – Merger/incorporation 
Concerning internal control, the role of co-operative member and their 
responsibility for the success of the enterprise is, in actual fact, greater than in 
publicly quoted companies as the market continuously monitors the company 
and distributes information via the media (Pellervo, 2000). It is expected that 
CCAM performance and management turnover should be negatively related. 
However, several factors, as the increasing complexity of banking activity and 
the decline in member participation in GA affect the efficiency of internal 
control governance mechanisms. Thus, is expected that CCAM external 
corporate governance mechanisms to be more efficient than the internal ones. 
Based on the values assumed by the dependent variable two different models 
(Table 1) are estimated to analyse the efficiency of the different control 
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mechanisms. Model 1 is similar to an “internal versus external” governance 
control mechanisms model and Model 2 considerers the different mechanisms 
individually. 
When different mechanisms are simultaneously present it was considered the 
one that takes deeper effects. Exemplifying, to the model 2, in a decreasing way, 
from the whole data sample, the CCAM-year observations for which a merger 
has occurred are first identified and a value of 6 is assigned to these 
observations. The checking process continues assigning the value correspondent 
to the observed situation (2nd column of Table 1). 
As explanatory variables (Table 2) are used some CCAM performance 
measures that are independent of the business strategy implemented. Thus, 
indicators related to business strategy as the transformation ratio were left out. 
Table 2 – Explanatory variables and expected coefficients signals 
Group 1 – Operational Efficiency and Growth  Expected signal 
Credit Overdue  = 
Credit Gross
OverdueCredit 
 
 + 
Customer Resources Growth  = 1
1- tin time  DepositsCustomer 
 tin time  DeposistsCustomer 
 −
 
_ 
Group 2 – Cost Efficiency  
Structural Costs = 
Margin Financial
*Expenses Staff  and  tiveAdministra
 + 
Staff Costs = 
Margin Financial
Expenses Benefits andSalary 
 
+ 
Expenses ratio =
Revenue  Total
Expenses  Total
 
+ 
Group 3 – Capitalization and Profitability  
Indebtedness  = 
Assets Total
Debt Total
 + 
ROSC =
Capital rsShareholde
ProfitNet 
 
_ 
Note: * Costs of general services incurred in controlling and directing an organization, such as 
accounting, energy and water supply, advertising, office resources expenses, etc. 
Credit overdue is an indicator of the CCAM credit risk management and is 
expected to have a positive influence over the probability of a CCAM 
governance intervention. Customer resources growth ratio is a measure of 
CCAM competitive strength and market share and should present a negative 
influence.  Expenses ratio, Staff and Structural Costs ratios are measures of the 
CCAM cost efficiency, and should positively influence the probability of a 
CCAM governance intervention. Finally, Indebtedness measures CCAM level of 
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capitalization and ROCS11 the return on the members’ investment in CCAM 
equity. Indebtedness should exercise a positive influence over the probability of 
CCAM governance intervention, and ROCS a negative one. 
Two control variables are used: the size of the CCAM expressed by the Total 
Assets at the end of the year and a temporal trend (Year). The total asset is often 
correlated with other unobserved variables such as asset diversification and 
managerial skills (Crespi et al., 2004). The trend tries to catch control shocks, 
like technological changes, common to all CCAM in a given year. 
Hence, the multinomial logit estimated is: 
∑
=
+
== j
k
kxi
jxi
1
i
exp1
expj)prob(y
β
β
  (4.1) 
where: Y - dependent variable, assuming the value of j = 0, 1, 2 for model 1, and 
j = 0, 1, 2, …, 6 for model 2; X - column vector of p+1 dimension, where p is 
the number of independent variables; and β - unknown parametric vector to be 
estimated. 
3.2. Data 
The analysis addresses the 1995-2009 period. Data refers to the end of the 
year and are all expressed in 1995 prices.  The financial data was obtained from 
CCAM annual accounting reports. Non-financial data (CCAM mergers and 
incorporations, board or chairman change and Central CCAM interventions) was 
obtained from the “Diário da República12”, Ministry of Justice website, CCAM 
Annual Reports and other SICAM official statements released during the study 
period. It was excluded from the data sample 25 CCAM from 1998, because of 
data missing from their annual financial reports, plus 21 observations 
corresponding to different CCAM-years, as we were not able to obtain their 
BoD configuration. At the end of this process we had a pool of 1,806 
observations from 15 years of unbalanced allocation: a) 1352 observations 
corresponding to CCAM not experiencing any governance intervention; 
b) 101 corresponding to CCAM with BoD partial turnover; c) 66 chairman 
turnover; d) 18 corresponding to BoD total turnover; e) 62 CCAM with Central 
CCAM intervention by an agent; f) 104 CCAM Central CCAM intervention by 
the nomination of interim directors; and g) 99 CCAM participating in a 
                                                          
11
 CCAM goal is not maximizing profit but, as mentioned earlier, the key-issue for CCAM is 
the lack of equity. Therefore, as the growth in equity is fuelled completely by net benefits 
retained, Return on Equity (ROE) is the correct variable to express the “profitability”. The 
option for Shareholders Capital instead of Equity is justified by the existence of CCAM with 
lower equity resulting from previous years accumulated losses that can jeopardise the study 
results. 
12
 Official Portuguese legislative journal. 
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merger/incorporation. Summary statistics for the sample are presented in 
Table 3, with the data grouped according to the governance mechanisms. 
Table 3 – Group summary statistics 
Variables Max Mean Median Min Std. Dev. 
N
o
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n
 
Total Assets* 352.466,002 44.877,260 32.404,210 726,085 44.659,690 
Customers’ resources growth 3,6115 0,1017 0,0855 -0,4048 0,1286 
Credit Overdue 0,7043 0,0820 0,0629 0,0000 0,0686 
Staff Costs 3,0879 0,3420 0,3302 -2,7670 0,2021 
Structural Costs 1,8038 0,2318 0,2295 -1,5653 0,1234 
Expenses Ratio 2,4544 0,8599 0,8566 0,3739 0,1348 
ROSC 5,4384 0,2261 0,1735 -11,8300 0,5958 
Indebtedness 4,3984 0,9230 0,9087 0,2025 0,1819 
Notes: * Thousands euro; Std. Dev. : Standard Deviation. 
Table 3 – Group summary statistics (Conclusion) 
 Variables Max Mean Median Min Std. Dev. 
B
o
D
 
Pa
rt
ia
l T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
Total Assets* 239.772,378 49.381,660 32.723,530 839,919 49.921,510 
Customers’ resources growth 0,4720 0,1334 0,1055 0,0090 0,0963 
Credit Overdue 0,3495 0,0861 0,0713 0,0024 0,0647 
Staff Costs 0,6952 0,3366 0,3237 0,1625 0,0890 
Structural Costs 0,5119 0,2317 0,2235 0,0824 0,0758 
Expenses Ratio 1,3484 0,8550 0,8663 0,4216 0,1076 
ROSC 7,7375 0,3966 0,2334 -0,9495 0,9180 
Indebtedness 1,0689 0,9123 0,9211 0,4801 0,0717 
Ch
ai
rm
an
 
Tu
rn
o
v
er
 
Total Assets* 223.352,011 37.985,120 27.298,970 753,808 38.438,230 
Customers’ resources growth 0,3108 0,0822 0,0772 -0,1757 0,0824 
Credit Overdue 0,3282 0,0853 0,0761 0,0069 0,0625 
Staff Costs 0,7616 0,3575 0,3415 0,1749 0,1039 
Structural Costs 0,4717 0,2434 0,2405 0,0616 0,0775 
Expenses Ratio 1,2753 0,8778 0,8647 0,6483 0,0999 
ROSC 1,3429 0,2529 0,1751 -0,8632 0,3359 
Indebtedness 1,1676 0,9130 0,9191 0,6931 0,0634 
B
o
D
 
To
ta
l T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
Total Assets* 117.756,340 31.475,490 21.456,010 3.275,865 27.662,950 
Customers’ resources growth 0,1976 0,0891 0,0880 -0,0330 0,0824 
Credit Overdue 0,5806 0,1233 0,0838 0,0208 0,1489 
Staff Costs 0,6473 0,3205 0,3703 -0,6186 0,2659 
Structural Costs 0,5438 0,2057 0,2190 -0,2841 0,15961 
Expenses Ratio 1,4206 0,9343 0,8937 0,6828 0,1767 
ROSC 0,6248 -0,1006 0,1117 -3,4418 0,9385 
Indebtedness 4,1053 1,0859 0,8969 0,8006 0,7566 
Indebtedness 4,3030 1,0473 0,9767 0,8180 0,4311 
Ce
n
tr
al
 
CC
A
M
 
A
ge
n
t 
Total Assets* 75.394,431 27.025,530 25.619,350 3.053,662 17.879,980 
Customers’ resources growth 0,8374 0,0683 0,0597 -0,1206 0,1250 
Credit Overdue 0,5790 0,1839 0,1659 0,0040 0,1086 
Staff Costs 1,1478 0,4099 0,3873 -0,2427 0,2131 
Structural Costs 0,7712 0,3018 0,3010 -0,1219 0,1236 
Expenses Ratio 4,1421 1,15786 0,9887 0,4327 0,5347 
ROSC 0,9433 -0,6344 -0,0520 -7,0617 1,5299 
Indebtedness 4,3030 1,0473 0,9767 0,8180 0,4311 
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In
te
rim
 
D
ire
ct
o
rs
 
Total Assets* 312.620,604 70.037,540 33.199,860 5.137,3510 81.927,560 
Customers’ resources growth 0,2686 0,0345 0,0364 -0,1802 0,0710 
Credit Overdue 0,6683 0,1879 0,1331 0,0147 0,1457 
Staff Costs 5,4095 0,2665 0,3878 -22,3365 2,3512 
Structural Costs 3,5156 0,2673 0,2836 -6,7920 0,8114 
Expenses Ratio 3,1628 1,0212 0,8965 0,2688 0,4486 
ROSC 9,3133 -0,2105 0,1321 -13,2999 2,6080 
Indebtedness 4,9566 1,1710 1,0255 0,8166 0,6130 
M
er
ge
r 
o
r 
In
co
rp
o
ra
tio
n
 
Total Assets* 111.289,268 19.165,410 12.559,780 1.218,769 19.292,83 
Customers’ resources growth 0,4453 0,0596 0,0682 -0,7874 0,1307 
Credit Overdue 0,7254 0,2021 0,1732 0,0119 0,1538 
Staff Costs 13,4681 0,6692 0,4020 -1,3229 1,5750 
Structural Costs 8,0206 0,4390 0,2893 -0,6081 0,9209 
Expenses Ratio 4,5101 1,1759 0,9768 0,6239 0,6098 
ROSC 5,3851 -0,6103 0,0544 -12,2339 2,7510 
Indebtedness 2,1132 1,0701 0,9867 0,7570 0,2462 
Notes:* Thousands euro; Std. Dev. : Standard Deviation. 
3.3. Results 
To determine which of the 7 performance indicators represent the probability 
of a governance intervention, a stepwise procedure combining forward and 
backward elimination is applied. The model starts as a baseline model without 
any variable on it. Then the indicators are considered one at each time and added 
to the model if succeeding in the selection criterion based on a p-value of 5%. 
When a new variable is added to the model, the variables previously included 
are evaluated for exclusion, at 10% significance level. The ones that fail are 
excluded. When no more variables can be added or removed, the algorithm 
stops. The application of this approach, using Likelihood ratio statistics, 
excludes the control variable Total Assets and the Indebtedness indicator from 
Model 1, and ROCS indicator from both models. Table 4 reports the results of 
the MNL models estimation. For each event, the coefficients measure the impact 
of each variable on the probability of each event with respect to the baseline 
case (no governance interventions in the following year), being to be interpreted 
as affecting the odds ratio. 
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Table 4 – MNL model results 
Mechanisms   
 
Performance 
Indicators 
Model 1 Model 2 
Internal External Internal External 
Board of 
Directors 
Turnover 
Central CCAM 
intervention & 
Merger or 
incorporation 
Board of Directors Turnover Central CCAM intervention Merger or 
incorporation Partial Chairman Total Agent Interim 
Directors 
Constant -2,027* 
(0,499) 
-5,108* 
(0,439) 
-1,005 
(1,140) 
-1,091 
(1,391) 
-5,823* 
(1,243) 
-6,374 
(0,718) 
-7,132* 
(0,668) 
-5,769* 
(0,672) 
Customers’ 
resources growth 
0,067 
(0,658) 
-5,451* 
(1,074) 
0,819 
(0,507) 
-4,901* 
(1,747) 
-2,961 
(2,805) 
-4,530*** 
(1,641) 
-8,161* 
(1,498) 
-4,747* 
(1,420) 
Credit overdue -0,388 
(1,315) 
9,167* 
(1,031) 
-0,294 
(1,848) 
-2,016 
(2,274) 
3,084 
(3,238) 
7,647* 
(1,574) 
10,101* 
(1,426) 
8,169* 
(1,358) 
Structural costs 1,692 
(1,096) 
4,913* 
(0,910) 
2,804*** 
(1,623) 
3,471*** 
(1,864) 
0,150 
(3,103) 
4,914* 
(1,142) 
4,849* 
(1,018) 
5,972* 
(1,035) 
Staff costs -0,600 
(0,433) 
-1,515* 
(0,360) 
-1,083 
(0,738) 
-1,030 
(1,018) 
0,286 
(1,628) 
-1,453* 
(0,489) 
-1,407* 
(0,412) 
-1,754* 
(0,453) 
Expenses ratio 0,450 
(0,560) 
2,052* 
(0,428) 
0,172 
(0,835) 
0,980 
(0,945) 
0,842 
(1,249) 
2,051* 
(0,517) 
1,227** 
(0,524) 
2,074* 
(0,485) 
Indebtedness __ __ -1,709 
(1,170) 
-1,872 
(1,460) 
0,997*** 
(0,601) 
0,445 
(0,534) 
1,208* 
(0,407) 
0,337 
(0,504) 
Total assets __ __ 0,000* 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
0,000 
(0,000) 
0,000** 
(0,000) 
0,000* 
(0,000) 
0,000* 
(0,000) 
Year -0,080* 
(0,025) 
0,027 
(0,024) 
-0,124* 
(0,036) 
-0,137* 
(0,045) 
-0,013 
(0,082) 
0,036 
(0,044) 
0,032 
(0,036) 
0,092** 
(0,039) 
Chi-squared  
(degrees of freedom) 
395,272 
(12) 
552,843 
(48) 
Significance level 0,000 0,000 
Notes: 1. Standard deviation in parenthesis;   2. *, **, ***: Significance level of 1%, 5% and  
10% respectively. 
The results of Model 1 show that the performance variables are not 
statistically significant for the group of internal governance mechanisms, i.e., 
they do not exercise any influence over the probability of BoD turnover. Thus, 
these governance mechanisms are not linked to the CCAM performance, 
confirming the weakness of CCAM internal control mechanisms. On the other 
side, most of the performance indicators (expect ROSC and Indebtedness) are 
statistically significant for the group of external governance mechanisms, i.e., 
they proved to have influence on the probability of a Central CCAM 
intervention and of a merger or incorporation. This outcome demonstrates that 
external governance mechanisms present greater efficiency in disciplining 
CCAM management than internal control mechanisms. 
Overall the signals presented by the variables coefficients correspond to the 
expected, except for the Staff Costs variable which surprisingly present a 
negative signal meaning that it negatively influences the probability of an 
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external governance mechanism act. The smaller a value for Staff Costs the 
greater is the probability of a Central CCAM intervention and of a merger or 
incorporation, which can be understood in the context of an option for the 
qualification/training of the human resources and maybe as consequence of 
members-employees dominance of GA meetings. 
The results achieved can be compared with those of other researchers. 
Blackwell et al. (1994) find a negative relation between accounting profitability 
and management turnover in the subsidiaries of Texas’ multibank holdings. 
Prowse (1997) found some substitution between regulation and other 
governance mechanisms in banks. Gorton and Schmid (1999) argue that only 
mergers and proxy contests are feasible for co-operative banks as control 
changes. Anderson and Campbell (2000) explain the lack of a relationship 
between executive change and the performance of Japanese banks as evidence 
of the banking sector’s inefficiencies. Crespi et al. (2004), for the Spanish 
banks, only observe a negative association between governance activity and 
economic performance in saving banks that merge, evidence of their weak 
internal governance mechanism. 
The Model 2 allows us to check for the influence of each mechanism 
individually. Regarding the probability of a BoD turnover, the Structural Costs 
has statistically positive influence over the probabilities of a partial turnover and 
chairman turnover. This last one is also (statistically) negatively influenced by 
Customers’ Resources Growth indicator. Total turnover is only negatively 
influenced by Indebtedness. Looking at these results we first note the real and 
perceived importance of Indebtedness indicator for CCAM survival, and of the 
BoD chairman role in detriment of other directors’ role. 
The probability of a Central CCAM intervention by the nomination of an 
agent or interim directors and the probability of a merger or incorporation are 
(statistically) negatively influenced by Customers’ Resources Growth and Staff 
Costs indicators and positively influenced by Credit Overdue, Structural Costs 
and Expenses Ratio indicators. Moreover, the probability of a Central CCAM 
intervention by the nomination of interim directors is also negatively influenced 
by Indebtedness. The results highlight the importance of the Central CCAM 
supervision task in monitoring their associates, and of the merging activity on 
SICAM overall performance. More specifically: 
- Customers’ Resources Growth is a measure of the CCAM competitive 
strength and in a certain way of the members’ commitment.  “Voting with 
their feet” is not usual (or easy) for CCAM members as it is for IOFs 
shareholders. The closing of the CCAM membership status is a delayed, 
often financially harmful operation that needs BoD previous approval. 
“Voting with their deposits” is the CCAM version of it! It is the first sign of 
the members’ disapproval of CCAM management. On the other hand, giving 
the saver profile of CCAM, Customers’ Resources Growth is also a measure 
of their market share and competitive strength. This is illustrated by the 
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statistically significance and negative sign associated to the variable 
coefficient. 
- The positive, statistically significant, sign of the Credit Overdue coefficient 
is in harmony with the importance of the management of credit risks for 
banks and particularly for CCAM, given that its net worth is highly 
dependent from financial margin results. CCAM double specialization (in 
customer served and products offered) reinforces this situation and 
strengthens the importance of an efficient (and prudential) risk management 
lending policy. 
- Regarding operational costs, the negative, statistically significant, sign of the 
Staff Costs coefficient is somewhat surprising. Small CCAM have limited 
ability to recruit highly qualified management and to train their staff (Cabo, 
2003) and usually the need of investment in qualified labour is the 
justification for CCAM mergers and incorporations. Labour market rigidity, 
CCAM policy of “no firings” (Cabo, 2003) and SICAM bet in the 
qualification/training of human resources can enlighten this outcome. 
Indeed, looking into SICAM social reports we observe positive values for 
job creation, with CCAM presenting, in the last decade, an annual average 
increase of 2%. Moreover, Crédito Agrícola puts money on internal and 
external training programmes for CCAM employees, providing internally 
more than 100,000 annual teaching hours, for 8,000 trainees, adding up to 
5,000 hours of external training. This bet in the qualification is reflected in 
the system of promotions, being most of it based on merit. On the other 
hand, most of the CCAM employees are also members of it. Ordinary 
members invest modestly and (consequently) had moderate interest in the 
development of CCAM. Members-employees have a big stake on CCAM 
(their job for start), thus, they are deeply involved in CCAM life, actively 
participating in the GA, and influencing CCAM strategies and policies. 
- Structural Costs and Expenses ratio present, as expected, a positive, 
statistically significant, sign, thus, proving to affect the probability of an 
external governance intervention. This is  coherent to the fact that the small 
size of the CCAM limits the rationalization of administrative costs (Cabo, 
2003) and, according to Cabo and Rebelo (2005), cuts-off in administrative 
costs is a determining factor leading to merger operations. Banking is a 
highly demanding activity, where cost efficiency is crucial for success. 
Literature suggests that banking industry competition is mostly based in cost 
efficiency neglecting revenue efficiency. Moreover, CCAM low income 
customers prevent CCAM from pursuing a revenue efficiency strategy, 
attaining high profit margins by applying superior prices in their operations. 
This strengthens the need for cost efficiency, justifying their positive 
influence over CCAM probability of governance intervention. 
  
25 
- Indebtedness negative, statically significant, sign for BoD total turnover and 
Central CCAM intervention by the nomination of interim directors’ 
mechanisms illustrates the importance of strong capitalization for CCAM 
success. The importance of banking system capitalization was evident in the 
2008 crisis and recently in the European sovereign debt crisis. CCAM co-
operative nature makes it arduous for them to boost equity. Considering that 
capitalization upgrading is expected to occur due to the increase of equity 
via better net benefits, profitability improvements are decisive. Thus, BoD 
turnover or the nominations of interim directors are entirely justifiable when 
a CCAM suffers capitalization problems. Furthermore, considering the 
solidarity mechanism acting in the SICAM is understandable this Central 
CCAM concern with the individual CCAM indebtedness. 
4. Conclusions 
Legislation, ownership structure (control and residual claims), “market” for 
corporate control, board of directors, debt-holders and central organizations and 
executive compensation, were identified as the major CCAM governance 
mechanisms operating in the CCAM associated from SICAM. 
The results of the MNL models to assess the efficiency of different control 
mechanisms in discipline CCAM management show that overall internal 
governance mechanisms (BoD turnover) are not related to the CCAM 
performance, which indicates potential weakness of the CCAM internal control 
mechanisms. On the other hand, external governance mechanisms are related to 
CCAM operational and cost efficiency indicators, demonstrating the importance 
of these mechanisms in disciplining CCAM management. Moreover, the results 
highlight the value of the supervision task of Central CCAM in the performance 
of the associates. 
Comparing the CCAM experiencing governance intervention with those that 
did not witness it, the main conclusions are: (1) Merged CCAM and those target 
of a Central CCAM intervention present weaker operational efficiency, either in 
credit management, with higher bad loans, or in customer resources 
management, with minor deposits growth. Moreover they experience cost 
efficiency deficiency, particularly, they hold heavy structural costs. 
Unexpectedly, the costs with human resources are smaller for these CCAM. 
(2) The choice among a Central intervention by the nomination of an agent or 
interim directors is mainly due to the performance of indebtedness indicator. A 
bad score in this indicator motivates a deeper interference from the central 
organization, even with potential replacement of CCAM governing bodies, 
attesting for the crucial role of indebtedness for CCAM survival. (3) Both 
CCAM with BoD partial turnover and chairman turnover hold heavier structural 
costs and CCAM with chairman turnover present minor customer resources 
growth. (4) Indebtedness is the only trigger for total BoD turnover. 
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These remarks confirm the decision-related incentive problems of co-
operatives, which create a potentially weak internal system of corporate 
governance (Crespi et al., 2004; Gorton and Schmid; 1999; Prowse, 1997). The 
robustness of the results would be improved if the effects of CCAM 
management and governing bodies’ remuneration and of debt-holder FGCAM 
monitoring in CCAM performance were analysed, which is a topic for further 
research. 
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